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Legislate First, Ask Questions Later:
Post-Enactment Evidence in Minority
Set-Aside Litigation
Mark L. Johnsont

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Fullilove v
Klutznick,1 where the Court upheld a federal minority business
set-aside program against an equal protection challenge, the
1980s saw a dramatic expansion in the use of such programs to
remedy perceived racism in the awarding of government contracts.2 The jurisprudential landscape changed in 1989, when the
Supreme Court subjected one such program to strict scrutiny in
City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co.' To fulfill the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held, a governmental entity must demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the minority set-aside plan, and narrowly tailor that plan to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination.!
Local governmental entities have found the requirements of
Croson difficult to meet. They have had to invest significant resources to produce statistical evidence establishing a level of racism sufficient to justify minority set-asides and preferences.!
Some localities have been hesitant to implement remedial programs in light of the general uncertainty as to how courts will
apply the Croson standard.! Others have implemented set-asides
t B.A. 1998, Purdue University; M.A. 2000, Purdue University; J.D. Candidate 2003,
University of Chicago.
1 448 US 448 (1980).
2 Docia Rudley and Donna Hubbard, What a Difference a Decade Makes: Judicial
Response to State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides Ten Years after City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 25 S Ill U L J 39, 40, 45 (2000) (criticizing Croson and noting that its
strict scrutiny of set-asides has made it more difficult for states and municipalities to
defend their programs).
3 488 US 469 (1989).
Id at 491-93.
Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of
Strict Scrutiny, 26 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 679, 682 (1995) (noting that localities are less
likely to enact affirmative action programs after Croson).
6 See, for example, Harrison& Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc v Cuomo,
981 F2d
50, 60 (2d Cir 1992).
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with relatively little quantifiable empirical evidence, gathering
the requisite data at the commencement of litigation and sometime after enactment of the plan.7
Federal Courts of Appeals have divided over whether such
post-enactment evidence is admissible to establish the constitutionality of a racial preference program.8 The Second,' Third, °
Ninth," Tenth, 2 and Eleventh Circuits 3 have held that courts
may properly consider such evidence, whereas the Sixth, 4 Seventh," and Federal Circuits'6 have held to the contrary. In 1996,
the Supreme Court in Shaw v Hunt" held that, in the context of
racial gerrymandering, a legislature must have sufficient evidence to support a racial distinction "before it embarks on an affirmative action program.'. This Comment argues that the
Court's decision in Shaw forecloses the admission of postenactment evidence in the context of minority set-asides, arguing
that its consideration is unjustifiable in all but a few limited contexts.
Part I briefly outlines the major Supreme and circuit court
cases relevant to the admissibility of post-enactment evidence in
constitutional challenges to racial set-asides. In light of this case
law, Part II argues that, under Shaw, post-enactment evidence is
not admissible to establish the constitutionality of such programs. It critiques the logic of the appellate courts which have
admitted such evidence. The Comment concludes by suggesting
7 See, for example, Coral Construction Co v King County, 941
F2d 910 (9th Cir 1991),

and Harrison,981 F2d 50 (2d Cir 1992).
8 Compare Coral Construction, 941 F2d at 919-21 (holding post-enactment evidence
admissible) with Rothe Development Corp v United States DOD, 262 F3d 1306, 1326-28
(Fed Cir 2001) (holding post-enactment evidence inadmissible).
9 Harrison,981 F2d at 60.
1o ContractorsAssociation of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc v City of Philadelphia,6 F3d
990, 1003-04 (3d Cir 1993).
" Coral Construction, 941 F2d at 919-21.
12 Concrete Works of Colorado v Denver,
36 F3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir 1994).
13 Engineering Contractors Association of South Florida
Inc v Metropolitan Dade
County, 122 F3d 895 (11th Cir 1997); Ensley Branch,NAACP v Seibels, 31 F3d 1548, 1568
(11th Cir 1994).
14 Associated General Contractorsof Ohio, Inc
v Drabik, 214 F3d 730, 738-39 (6th Cir
2000), cert denied, Johnson v Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc, 531 US 1148
(2001).
is BuildersAssociation of GreaterChicago v County of Cook, 256 F3d 642, 645 (7th
Cir
2001).
16 Rothe, 262 F3d at 1325-28.
17 517 US 899 (1996).
18 Id at 910, quoting Wygant v Jackson Board
of Education, 476 US 267, 277 (1986)
(emphasis in Shaw).
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an alternative regime which would allow governmental entities to
avoid the pitfalls of inadmissibility, while requiring courts to consider only that evidence available at the time of enactment.
I. RACIAL SET-ASIDES IN THE COURTS

A. Applying Strict Scrutiny: Croson
In Croson, the Supreme Court clarified its opinion in Fullilove by holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a municipality to make specific findings of racial discrimination prior to awarding contracts through
a racial set-aside program. 9 Croson further held that a city must
narrowly tailor such programs to redress empirically established
20
wrongs.
At issue in Croson was the city of Richmond's requirement
that prime construction contractors subcontract at least 30 percent of the work to Minority Business Entities (MBEs)." The
statute defined an MBE as a business in which "black, Spanishspeaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleutian native" owners
held at least a 51% interest.' The city claimed that the plan was
"remedial" and enacted to promote wider minority participation
in public construction projects.'3
The Supreme Court determined that the city had failed to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest justifying the
plan.' Since the plan denied non-MBEs the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts on the basis of race,
the Court analyzed the plan under strict scrutiny.2' Strict scrutiny requires a firm evidentiary basis for concluding that the underrepresentation of minorities is the result of past discrimination.2 ' Only with such evidentiary justification can a governmental entity utilize the "highly suspect" tool of racial classification,
with its inherent risks of stigmatic harm and illegitimate motiva-

'9 Croson, 488 US at 493, 498-500 (applying strict scrutiny and noting that Richmond
did not have a "strong" evidentiary basis to justify its set-aside program).
20 Id at 507-08 (noting that Richmond's program was not narrowly tailored because it
employed a quota and did not consider race-neutral alternatives to race based remedies).
21 Id at 477-78 (describing Richmond's program).
22 Id at 478.
" Croson, 488 US at 478.
24 Id at 485-86.
2
26

Id at 493-98.
Id at 489-99.
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tion (such as racial animus or politicking).7 In addition, a court
must consider such evidence to determine whether the means
chosen are narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination.8
As evidence in support of the set-aside, Richmond offered the
fact that, though the city's population was 50 percent AfricanAmerican, it awarded less than 1 percent of its construction contracts to MBEs.2 ' While such a statistical disparity might suggest
racism in the hiring of relatively fungible entry-level employees,
the Court held that the relevant sample for demonstrating discriminatory exclusion in the construction context, where bidders
must have special qualifications, is the number of minorities
qualified to undertake the particular task.39 In Croson, Richmond
would have had to adduce evidence to the effect that, though 30
percent of the qualified contractors in the area were minorityowned, the city awarded a much smaller percentage of its contracts to MBEs."
The city also pointed to low minority membership in the
various trade organizations that appeared at hearings in opposition to the set-aside. 3 The Court noted that there were numerous

explanations other than racism for this low minority membership, including past societal discrimination and the possibility
that minorities might simply be attracted to industries other
than construction.' For low minority membership to be relevant,
the city would have had to provide statistical evidence of a disparity between the number of MBEs eligible for membership in
trade organizations and the number actually accepted as members.
Finally, the city pointed to Congress's generalized findings in
Fullilove that there had been nationwide racial discrimination in
the construction industry.35 The Croson Court found these of limited value because they suggested very little about the relevant
construction market of Richmond, Virginia. 36 The Court noted
27 Croson, 488 US at 493.
28

Id.

Id at 479-80.
Id at 501-02.
See Croson, 488 US at 502-03 (noting that without such evidence, Richmond cannot justify its affirmative action plan).
32 Id at 480, 503.
Id at 503.
'o

34

Id at 503-04.

31

Croson, 488 US at 504 (discussing Fullilove).

36

Id.
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that Congress had explicitly recognized that market conditions
will vary from place to place, and therefore had provided a procedure for obtaining a waiver from set-aside requirements where
warranted by local conditions.37
The Croson Court determined that Richmond's statistical
evidence provided insufficient grounds for concluding that remedial action was necessary.' Further, even if some remedial action
was warranted, the Court found that the evidence provided no
basis for determining whether the requirement that 30 percent of
all municipal contracts be awarded to MBEs was narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination.39 The Court was particularly
troubled by the inclusion of Eskimos and Aleutian Natives on the
list of eligible minorities, groups against which the city of Rich40
mond had likely never had even the opportunity to discriminate.
The Court believed that the city had imposed its 30 percent quota
arbitrarily.4 '
The Court further noted that the city had failed to consider
race-neutral remedies, such as municipal financing for small
firms, which might have helped to improve minority access to
capital, thus leveling the playing field.42 Even if an outright racial
classification were the only practicable means of remedying discrimination, the 30 percent quota would only be narrowly tailored
to the goal of achieving a balance between the minorities in the
general population and those in the construction industry." Such
a goal, the Court suggested, rests on the unrealistic assumption
that minorities will choose a given trade or industry in mathematical proportion to their representation in the local population.'"
Though the Croson Court clearly stated its preference for
race-neutral remedial measures, it did not specifically consider
whether, where such measures have been found impracticable or
37

Id.

38 Id at 500 ("None of these 'findings,' singly or together, provide the city of Richmond

with a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.").
39 Croson, 488 US at 507 ("[1It is almost 'impossible to assess whether the Richmond
Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to identified
discrimination in any way.").
40 Id at 506 ("The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a
practical matter, may
never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.").
41
42

Id at 507-08.
Id.

Croson, 488 US at 507.
44 Id.

308

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2002:

ineffectual, a governmental entity can implement a racial setaside or similar program on insufficient evidence, and then
gather supporting evidence in the event of litigation. 5 Lower
courts have struggled to determine what the outcome might have
been had Richmond produced post-enactment evidence establishing that its 30 percent set-aside was indeed narrowly tailored to
remedy past discrimination in the awarding of construction contracts.6
B.

Applying Croson: Post-Enactment Evidence before Shaw

The Ninth Circuit, in Coral Construction Co v King County,"7
was the first federal court of appeals to consider whether courts
should admit post-enactment evidence in racial set-aside litigation. In that case, King County, Washington had put into place a
system that gave preference to bids from minority- and womanowned construction contractors that were within 5 percent of the
lowest non-MBE bid. 9 In litigation challenging the scheme, the
county sought to introduce two reports documenting the impact of
discrimination in the local construction industry and in local
goods and services industries.n The county prepared the reports
in its amended ordinance one year after it had originally enacted
the program."
With regard to the admissibility of these post-enactment reports, the Ninth Circuit held that while a "municipality must
have some concrete evidence of discrimination in a particular industry before it may adopt a remedial program," even if only limited disparity studies and anecdotal evidence, it would not automatically strike down a program if the evidence available at the
time of enactment did not completely satisfy both prongs of the
strict scrutiny test.5 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that courts
should evaluate such programs on the basis of all the evidence
presented to the district court, whether that evidence was availSee id at 509 (noting that "If the City of Richmond had evidence before it..." but
did not specify when it had to have such evidence.)
46 See text accompanying notes (noting circuit split on the
admissibility of postenactment evidence).
47 941 F2d 910 (9th Cir 1991).
48 Id at 919-22.
49 Id at 914 n 3 (5 percent for bids of $10,000 and under; a different
system if the bid
is greater than $10,000).
'0 Id at 915 (noting that the county prepared statistical and anecdotal evidence).
5'Coral Construction, 941 F2d at 915.
52 Id at 920.
45
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able to the legislature before or after enactment. 3 The Coral Construction court's only requirement was that there be sufficient
evidence to establish that, at the time of enactment, the legislature had good-faith reason to believe that discrimination had occurred."
The Coral Construction court thought that admitting all evidence available at the time of trial was the only sensible legal
rule." To support this decision, the court noted that if postenactment evidence were inadmissible, governmental entities
would be in a no-win situation.6 Presented with evidence that is
solid, though insufficient under Croson, of its own culpability in
fostering racial discrimination, a city would have to expend substantial resources developing evidence in support of a racial setaside or preference plan." While studying the problem, existing
discriminatory practices would likely continue, thus exposing the
city to liability from discrimination suits brought by minorities. 3
Alternatively, requiring a showing of some evidence of discrimination at the time of enactment reduces the likelihood that
whites injured by a set-aside plan could successfully sue the city. 9
This is because such a rule gives a city the opportunity to produce
the evidence necessary to defeat reverse-discrimination suits.6 A
set-aside without evidence of a violation is presumptively invalid.6' The Coral Construction court would not invalidate a plan,
however, where the government had a good faith reason to believe that discrimination had occurred, so long as evidence before
the court demonstrated the need for the program. 61

63 Id.
64 Id at 921 ("[Wlhere a state has a good faith reason to believe that
systemic
discrimination has occurred, and is continuing to occur, in a local industry, we will not
strike down the program for inadequacy of the record if subsequent factfinding bears out
the need for the program.").
Coral Construction,941 F2d at 920-21.
" Id.
5' Id at 921.

Id ("... a municipality having such evidence would face the dilemma of deciding
whether to wait the months necessary for further development of the record, risking constitutional culpability due to its inaction, or to act and to risk liability for acting prematurely but otherwise justifiably. The rule we articulate today lessens the likelihood of such
dilemmas.")
' See Coral Construction, 841 F2d at 921.
See id.
61 Id ([A] remedy without any evidence of a violation is presumptively void."
62 Id (holding that a plan will not be invalidated "solely because the record at time of
enactment did not measure up to constitutional standards," and that courts should consider post-enactment evidence).
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The Second Circuit's decision in Harrison& Burrowes Bridge
Constructors, Inc v Cuomo' accepted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, determining that it would assess the constitutional sufficiency of a state's justification for an affirmative action plan on
whatever evidence was presented at trial, whether pre- or postenactment." The court noted that the original statute did not set
specific goals for its set-aside program, leaving these to be determined by the implementing agency upon review of whatever data
it found post-enactment. The court wrote that "when reviewing a
statute's constitutionality, courts routinely consider any interpretive limitations placed on it by implementing regulations, which
obviously must follow the statute's enactment."O The court referred to cases where the Supreme Court had upheld statutes as
enforced even though they may have been facially invalid. 7 Since
evidence of how a statute is enforced necessarily post-dates enactment, and there is no doubt as to the admissibility such of evidence, the court held that empirical data gathered following the
enactment of a minority set-aside program may be considered by
a court ruling on the program's constitutionality.
The Eleventh Circuit has twice held that courts may consider
post-enactment evidence in suits challenging race-based classifications, first in Ensley Branch, NAACP v Seibels," and later in
EngineeringContractors Association of South Florida Inc v Metropolitan Dade County.70 In Seibels, the court reconsidered the
validity of a consent decree which a city put in place to combat
the racially disparate effects of a written test it used in the hiring
and promotion of police officers and firefighters." The court held
that, as long as the city could show strong evidence of the need

981 F2d 50 (2d Cir 1992).
Id at 60.
Id.
Id.
" Harrison, 981 F2d at 60, citing Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 795
(1989) (upholding statute against facial challenge because city interpreted the guideline in
a manner that provided sufficient guidance to officials charged with its enforcement);
Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc, 455 US 489, 504 (1982) ("The
village may adopt administrative regulations that will sufficiently narrow potentially
vague or arbitrary interpretations of the ordinance.").
Harrison,981 F2d at 60.
31 F3d 1548, 1568 (11th Cir 1994).
70 122 F3d 895, 912 (11th Cir 1997).
" Ensley Branch, 31 F3d at 1564-78 (analyzing the consent decrees under Croson's
compelling government interest and narrow tailoring requirements, with respect to longterm and annual goals).
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justified.
be
would
department
that
in
affirmative action
The Third Circuit has also upheld the admissibility of postenactment evidence in considering injunctive relief.2 The court
worried, as did the Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction, that excluding post-enactment evidence would put cities and states in a
precarious position." The Third Circuit noted that governmental
entities must proactively remedy past discrimination and simultaneously ensure that their efforts do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."6 Disallowing postenactment evidence where there is some evidence of governmental participation in discriminatory practices, the court noted,
would prevent cities from enacting remedial measures until further study, thus perpetuating the government's discriminatory
practices.6 The court noted the risk that allowing such evidence
might enable legislators to enact racial set-asides without sincere
remedial intent, but found that concern negligible because the
evidence in question there was essentially a reordering of evidence that was available at the time of the initial enactment.
The Tenth Circuit allowed consideration of post-enactment
8 There,
evidence in Concrete Works of Colorado v City of Denver."
the city had implemented a plan whereby bidders for some city
construction work would receive preferential treatment if they
were minority- or woman-owned, involved a minority- or womanowned subcontractor or venture partner, or that they had made
good faith efforts to involve minority- or woman- owned contractors. " Concrete Works brought an equal protection challenge to
the ordinance when it lost a contract to a less competitive bid
solely because the winning bidder met the requirements of the

Id at 1567-68 (upholding the consideration of post-enactment evidence because
"this case concerns only the prospective validity of the decrees, and prospective validity
can be established just as well with new evidence as with old...").
"s ContractorsAssociation of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc v City of Philadelphia,6 F3d
990, 1003-04 (3d Cir 1993).
Id at 1004.
76 Id, citing Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267, 291 (1986) ("[Plublic
employers are trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability to
nonminorities if affirmative action is taken.. .") (O'Connor concurring).
" ContractorsAssociation, 6 F3d at 1004.
77 Id.
78 36 F3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir 1994).
" Id at 1516.
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program. 8 Concrete Works challenged the evidentiary basis for
the ordinance, arguing that the city's evidence offered at trial
impermissibly considered discrimination from other geographic
areas, constituted limited anecdotal evidence, and relied on data
about minority- and woman-owned business activity in the Denver construction market through two years after the enactment of
the ordinance.8
The Concrete Works court upheld the consideration of all the
challenged evidence, writing that it did not read "Croson's evidentiary requirement as foreclosing the consideration of postenactment evidence."' Accurate post-enactment data, the court
noted, could be very useful in evaluating the remedial effects or
shortcomings of the race-conscious program.83 This was, the court
said, all the more true in the instant case where the ordinance
had initially been enacted in 1983, and then reenacted with modifications in 1990.84 Evidence of discrimination subsequent to the
1990 ordinance might, the court said, be useful in determining
whether the deviation from equal treatment continues to be nec85
essary.
C.

Shaw: Increased Scrutiny for Post-Enactment Evidence

Lower federal courts decided all of these cases prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw.8 There, the Court considered
an equal protection challenge alleging that an electoral redistricting scheme impermissibly utilized racial gerrymandering.87 Discussing Croson and Wygant v Jackson Board of Education,m the
Court identified two conditions necessary to finding that a government's interest in combating racial discrimination is compel-

Id at 1518 n 5 (noting that Concrete Works presented "uncontested" evidence that it
submitted the lowest bid and did not get the contract because it was not a minority-owned
business, or otherwise qualified for special treatment under the statute).
81 Id at 1520-21.
82 Concrete Works, 36 F3d at 1521.
Id (noting that such evidence is only valuable after it is "carefully scrutinized for
accuracy").
' Id (noting that since Concrete Works sought a preliminary injunction, the postenactment evidence was relevant because it related to prospective relief).
Id.
See Shaw, 517 US at 910 (noting that a legislature must have evidence of past
discrimination before enacting a race-based gerrymandering of voting districts); See also
Part I B (discussing pre-Shaw decisions admitting post-enactment evidence).
'7 Id at 901-08 (outlining the procedural history and facts of the case).
476 US 267, 277 (1986) (noting that legislatures must have some evidence of
discrimination to justify their affirmative action programs).
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ling. 89 First, Shaw held that the state must identify the targeted
discrimination with some specificity.' A generalized assertion of
discrimination is inadequate because it provides a legislative
body no guidance to determine the scope of the injury it seeks to
remedy. 1 Second, Shaw held that the legislature must have a
"strong basis in evidence" to conclude that remedial action was
necessary "before it embarks on an affirmative-action program." 2
Shaw emphasized Wygant's requirement that a legislative
body have pre-enactment evidence sufficient to support a racial
classification in order to fulfill the requirements of strict scrutiny. 3 In Wygant, teachers challenged the validity of a collective
bargaining agreement under which the Jackson School Board
extended certain protections against layoffs exclusively to minority employees.9' The Board defended the agreement by pointing to
its desire to combat general societal discrimination by using layoff protection to maintain minority role models among the ranks
of its educators.95 Though the district court and the Sixth Circuit
had upheld the provision,6 the Supreme Court was not convinced
of its constitutionality.97 The Court held that an assertion of general societal racism does not meet the requirement that a legislature act pursuant to empirical evidence of prior discrimination by
a governmental entity before allowing that specific entity the remedial use of racial classifications.9 Furthermore, the Wygant
role model theory provided no logical stopping point for extending
remedial layoff protection." The Court worried that such a theory
would allow the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and
layoff practices even when they no longer furthered a legitimate
remedial purpose. °°

91

See Shaw, 517 US at 910.
Id at 909.
Id, citing Croson, 488 US at 498, (noting that generalized assertions of past dis-

crimination are inadequate because they provide "no guidance for the city's legislative
body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy and would allow racebased decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and duration.").
92 Shaw, 517 US at 910, citing Wygant, 476 US at 277 (emphasis in Shaw).
9 Shaw, 517 US at 908-910.
476 US at 270-73.
Id at 274.
546 F Supp 1195, 1202 (E D Mich 1982); 746 F2d 1152, 1156-57 (6th Cir 1994).
17 See Wygant, 476 US at 274-76 (rejecting the lower courts'
analysis).
Id at 274.
Id at 275.
100Id.
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Wygant, however, did not specifically foreclose the
admissibility of post-enactment evidence.'0 ' As Coral Construction
noted, in a post-Wygant decision, a court may find a program
constitutional if a governmental entity presented evidence which
convinced the legislature that there had been prior discrimination. '°2 Thus, while Wygant requires some pre-enactment
evidence, supplementary post-enactment evidence might still be
admissible.
Shaw appears to bar such a reading of Wygant. The Court
there held that a compelling interest requires that "the State ...
show that the alleged objective was the legislature's 'actual purpose' for the discriminatory classification ...and the legislature
must have had a strong basis in evidence to support that justification before it implements the classification.""3 Therefore, the
only way a court can determine whether a legislature's intent
was to remedy past racial discrimination is by looking at the evidence before that body at the time it drafted the legislation."'
Without a strong evidentiary basis at the time of enactment, a
court can only rely on the legislature's self-interested claims of
good intentions.'0 ' Such claims are insufficient without substantial evidence to provide constitutional support for a racial classification.'0"
D. The Admissibility of Post-Enactment Evidence after Shaw
While the decisions prior to Shaw uniformly allowed the admission of post-enactment evidence,' 7 the post-Shaw jurisprudential landscape is not nearly so neat and tidy. Some courts have

...See Wygant, 476 US at 277 (determining that "a public employer like the Board
must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative-action program, it has convincing
evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have sufficient evidence to
justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination.").
" Coral Construction, 941 F2d at 921 ("[W]here a state has a good faith reason to
believe that systematic discrimination has occurred, and is continuing to occur, in a local
industry, we will not strike down the program for inadequacy of the record if subsequent
factfinding bears out the need for the program."); see also notes 103-105.
13 Shaw, 517 US at 908 (emphasis added).
" See id at 908-09, n 4 (noting that avoiding meritless lawsuits is not a compelling
state interest).
Id, citing Croson, 488 US at 500 (noting "strong basis in evidence" requirement).
See Croson, 488 US at 493 (noting that "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.").
"' See part I B (discussing pre-Shaw cases).
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continued to consider post-enactment evidence,'. while others
have held that Shaw precludes such evidence. 9
More than a year after Shaw, the Eleventh Circuit in Engineering Contractors"' upheld a district court's consideration of
post-enactment evidence."' There, Dade County had implemented
a multifaceted program to increase minority participation in
county construction projects.1

12

A group of trade associations had

previously challenged the program and reached a settlement, but
now challenged it again in light of Croson's holding that such a
programs are subject to strict scrutiny." " The district court found
that the evidentiary basis for the program was insufficient to
pass strict scrutiny. ' The bulk of the evidence was drawn from
years post-dating the initial enactment of the program in 1982.1""
Dade County charged that the district court had erred insofar as
it had failed to recognize that the reductions in racial discrimination apparent in the post-1982 statistical data were in part due to
the existence of the program in question."'
Making no mention of Shaw, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
consideration of post-enactment evidence and the district court's
decision not to speculate about how the data might have looked in
the absence of the challenged program."7 The Eleventh Circuit
held that "formal findings of discrimination need neither precede
nor accompany the adoption of affirmative action.""" The court
warned that governmental entities must be careful in their use of
post-enactment evidence, however, as the challenged programs
See EngineeringContractors, 122 F3d at 912 (ruling, in 1997, that post-enactment
evidence is admissible); Adarand Constructors,Inc v Slater 228 F3d 1147, 1166 (10th Cir
2000) (admitting post-enactment evidence).
" See, for example, Rothe Development Corp v United States DOD, 262 F3d 1306,
1325-28 (Fed Cir 2001).

.. 122 F3d 895.
"' Id at 911-12.
112 Id at 901 (noting that the program provided set asides,
subcontractor goals, project
goals, bid preferences of up to 10 percent, and preferences for factors other than price to
minority- and woman- owned businesses).
. Id at 901-02.
114 EngineeringContractorsAssociation v Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F Supp 1546,
1584 (S D Fla 1996) (holding that the statistical "evidence presented by the defendants
does not constitute an adequate showing of discrimination" to pass constitutional muster
under strict or intermediate scrutiny review).
.. Id at 1557-58 (noting that most of the data at trial was post enactment evidence
from the years 1989-1991).
...See EngineeringContractors,122 F3d at 912.
...Id ("What the district court did not do is speculate about what the data might have
shown had the BBE program never been enacted. We find no fault in that approach, because a strong basis in evidence can never arise from sheer speculation.").
...Id at 911, citing Ensley Branch, 31 F3d at 1565.
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may sometimes reduce apparent discrimination such that the
evidence no longer supports the racial classifications as enacted. '
In its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc v Slater,'2° on
remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit also allowed
the consideration of post-enactment evidence."' Adarand had lost
a contract to install guardrails along a federal highway to a less
competitive bid by a minority-owned business.'2 Adarand challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute which provided
prime contractors a bonus of up to 10 percent of the value of an
approved subcontract for employing a disadvantaged business
entity, defined in part as a minority-owned entity qualified to
perform the subcontract. 12'3 The Supreme Court had considered
various aspects of the litigation several times, and reviewed the
statute under a strict scrutiny standard.' 4
In reviewing the evidentiary basis for the federal program at
issue in Adarand, the Tenth Circuit considered post-enactment
evidence introduced by the defendants in addition to Congressional findings.' 5 Consideration of such evidence was appropriate,
the court noted, because the defendants had gathered it in response to the Supreme Court's decision to apply a strict scrutiny
standard to the statutes in question.' 6 This is presumably because it would be unfair to require a program to have met the
requirements of strict scrutiny when it was only subjected to such
scrutiny after enactment. The court reviewed a plethora of evidence, much of it postdating enactment of the program, suggesting a nationwide pattern of private discrimination by prime contractors, bonding companies, suppliers, and others, making it difficult for minority owned contractors to win subcontracts on government funded projects.' On the basis of this evidence, the court
' Engineering Contractors,122 F3d at 912 ("Government actors are free to introduce
post-enactment evidence in defending affirmative action programs, but if that evidence
fails to meet the applicable evidentiary burden, a federal court cannot simply presume
that, absent the programs, sufficient evidence of discrimination would have been found.").
0 228 F3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir 2000) (holding that the government met its evidentiary burden to support a compelling interest), on remand from the Supreme Court, 528
US 216 (1995), cert regranted as Adarand Constructors, Inc v Mineta, 532 US 941, and
cert dismissed, 534 US 103 (2001).
,21 Id.
.. Adarand, 228 F3d at 1156.
' Id at 1160-61 (describing the statute).
,u Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pefia, 515 US 200, 235 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny).
Adarand, 228 F3d at 1167, citing Coral Construction,36 F3d at 1521.
Id at 1166 n 11.
127See id at 1168-1175.
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found that the government had fulfilled its burden of presenting
a strong basis in evidence demonstrating a compelling interest.U8
In Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc v Drabik,29
Ohio-based contractors challenged a state program enacted in
1980 which set aside 5 percent of the value of all state contracts
for minority owned contractors.' The evidence before the Ohio
legislature at the time of enactment was limited to comparisons
between the percentage of all state construction contracts that
went to minority owned businesses and the total percentage of
businesses in the state with minority ownership."' The program
failed the strong basis in evidence prong of Croson, because the
legislature did not consider how many of the qualified and willing
construction companies in Ohio were MBEs.' The legislation also
failed the narrow tailoring prong because it benefited minorities
against whom there was no documented discrimination in the
construction industry and because it contained no provision for
its own demise at such time as it fulfilled its goal of eliminating
racial discrimination in the awarding of state construction contracts. 33
The state sought a continuance to perform the requisite statistical studies."' Without mentioning Shaw, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the district court's refusal to grant the motion."' Under
Croson, the court wrote, the state must have had a sufficient basis in evidence for a racial classification prior to enactment, noting that "the time of a challenge to the statute, at trial, is not the
time for the state to undertake factfinding."'

The court noted

with approval the district court's admonition that the city should
have updated its statistical database throughout the program's
twenty-year duration."' This suggests that the court approved of
using post-enactment evidence to determine whether a set-aside
is still narrowly tailored, or might require some amendment in

Id at 1174-75.
214 F3d 730, 738-39 (6th Cir 2000).
" Id at 733 (describing procedural history and Ohio's Minority Business Enterprise
Act).
"' Id at 736.
'

'2

1'

Id.

. Drabik, 214 F3d at 737-38.
'34Id

at 738.

" See id at 738-39.
. Id at 738.
"' Drabik, 214 F3d at 738-39.

318

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2002:

light of the remedial effect of the set-asides during the course of
their existence."

The Federal Circuit in Rothe Development Corp v United
States DOD' 9 held that post-enactment evidence is inadmissible
to establish the constitutionality of a program as enacted.40 In

Rothe, a Department of Defense contractor challenged a federal
statutory scheme that allowed a percentage adjustment to the
bids of MBE contractors, thus rendering bids by such contractors
more competitive."' The Department of Defense sought to introduce evidence of past discrimination which postdated the reauthorization of the statutory scheme. "2 The court noted substantial support among the circuits that such evidence is admissible
in limited circumstances.13 These circumstances include where

the legislature has changed the scope of racial classification since
enactment,'" when injunctive relief is requested; and when a
court must determine whether an existing race-based program is
narrowly tailored.

14

The Federal Circuit in Rothe acknowledged that statements
in Wygant and Croson can be interpreted as requiring substantially less evidence to support enactment than must be presented
at trial.4" The court noted, however, that Shaw clarified the
evidence."
Court's position on the admissibility of post-enactment

The court interpreted Shaw as holding that there is no difference
in the evidentiary burden that must be faced during litigation
and that which a legislature must have when it enacts a racial
classification.

48

In particular, Shaw requires that a legislature have a "strong
basis in evidence" before it enacts a racial classification. 4 9 The

Rothe court note that "strong basis in evidence" is the same
" See West Tennessee Chapterof Associated Builders and Contractors,Inc v City of
Memphis, 138 F Supp 2d 1015, 1020 (W D Tenn 2000), citing Drabik, 214 F3d at 736,
(holding that a city should update statistics to ensure that a remedial plan remains
framed to meet its objectives).
..262 F3d 1306 (Fed Cir 2001).
" See id at 1324-1328 (discussing the admissibility of post-enactment evidence to
establish the constitutionality of a program as enacted).
", Id at 1312-16 (describing the program at issue).
Id at 1324-25.
Rothe, 262 F3d at 1325.
...
Id, citing Concrete Works, 36 F3d at 1521.
...
Rothe, 262 F3d at 1325, citing ContractorsAssociation of 'EasternPennsylania,Inc v
City of Philadelphia,6 F3d 990, 1004 (3d Cir 1993).
" Rothe, 262 F3d at 1325.
47

Id.

Id at 1326-27.
Id at 1327, citing Shaw, 517 US at 910.
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phrase used by the Court in Croson and Wygant to describe the
volume of evidence required at trial to uphold a racial classification.' The court wrote that Shaw makes it clear that "the quantum of evidence that is ultimately necessary to uphold racial classifications must have actually been before the legislature at the
time of enactment."'"' Establishing that a legislature had a constitutionally permissible intent requires strong pre-enactment evidence.'12 As such, under Shaw, a governmental entity cannot use

post-enactment evidence to establish the constitutionality of a
racial classification as enacted, because such evidence is necessarily silent on the crucial constitutional question of legislative
intent.
The district court for the District of Maryland in Associated
Utility Contractorsof Md, Inc v Mayor and City Council of Baltimore"' explicitly held that post-enactment evidence is inadmissible, because the Supreme Court in Shaw provided controlling authority on the role of post-enactment evidence.'" The Seventh Circuit in Builders Association of Greater Chicago v County of Cook"
noted the city's admission that it had no pre-enactment evidence
to support its racial set-aside program."' The court struck down
the ordinance, citing Shaw, Coral Construction, and Concrete
Works for the proposition that a city must have a strong basis in
evidence for considering a discriminatory remedy appropriate
before adopting such a remedy.'0 A district court in that circuit
later held such evidence inadmissible in Petit v City of Chicago."'
While the Supreme Court has never squarely faced the question of the admissibility of post-enactment evidence in the context
of racial set-asides, it strongly signaled in Shaw that courts
should not consider such evidence when ruling on the constitutionality of racial classifications.'6 ' Several lower courts, including
" Rothe, 262 F3d at 1327.
Id.

Id at 1328 (holding that "if the pre-reauthorization evidence is insufficient to maintain the program when the program is challenged as reauthorized, the program must be
invalidated, regardless of the extent of post-reauthorization evidence").
" Id ("Requiring a 'strong basis in evidence' before the legislature enacts or reauthorizes a racial classification is essential for verifying that a program is truly "remedial" in
design.").
"4 83 F Supp 2d 613 (D Md 2000).
' Id at 621.
"4 256 F3d 642 (7th Cir 2001).
"'

"4

Id at 645.
Id.

".

2002 US Dist LEXIS 38 (N D Ill).

"

See Shaw,517 US at 910.

"7
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the Federal Circuit in Rothe, have held that this encompasses
racial set-asides. 6 " Some courts continue to consider postenactment evidence, however, and future courts must still reckon
with the pre-Shaw arguments for admitting such evidence."
II. POST-ENACTMENT EVIDENCE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY INADMISSIBLE

This Comment does not challenge the admissibility of postenactment evidence in determining the prospective validity of
injunctions or consent decrees. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in
Seibels, post-enactment studies seem relevant where the concern
is whether an existing program is working and narrowly tailored
now or will continue to be so in the future.1" Nor does this Comment challenge the admissibility of evidence post-dating the initial enactment of legislation when the legislature has subsequently changed the scope of the racial classification. It does not
challenge the admissibility of post-enactment evidence where a
court unexpectedly subjects the classification in question to
heightened scrutiny sometime after enactment, as occurred in
Adarand.'
Rather, this Comment considers whether courts can and
should admit post-enactment evidence when initially scrutinizing
a statutory set-aside scheme. Following the Federal Circuit in
Rothe, this section argues that the Shaw Court signaled that
such evidence is inadmissible in determining the constitutionality
of a classification as enacted. Shaw is relevant not only in the
racial gerrymandering context, but in the racial set-aside context
as well.
This section then critiques the legal justifications courts have
offered for accepting post-enactment evidence: The Second Circuit's analogy to interpretive limitations, and the Ninth Circuit's
concern over the "Hobson's Choice" faced by local governments
between liability to minorities and to a white majority if postenactment evidence is inadmissible. To deal with these concerns,
courts should adopt an alternative legal regime incorporating an

161

See Rothe, 262 F3d at 1328.

See, for example, Engineering ContractorsAssociation of South FloridaInc v MetropolitanDade County, 122 F3d 895, 911 (11th Cir 1997) ("formal findings of discrimination need neither precede nor accompany the adoption of affirmative action.").
31 F3d at 1567-68.
228 F3d at 1160 n 11.
162
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affirmative defense against liability where good faith, reasonable
efforts are underway to study and address racial discrimination.
A. The Inadmissibility of Post-Enactment Evidence After Shaw
The Shaw Court described two requirements for a state's interest in remedying the effects of racial discrimination to rise to
the level of a compelling interest."5 First, the legislature must
show that remedying past discrimination was its actual objective
in enacting the racial classification,"'6 and second, it must have
strong empirical evidence of discrimination before it enacts an
affirmative action program.167
To illustrate the first requirement, consider Shaw. The district court determined that the North Carolina legislature failed
to establish that an interest in ameliorating past discrimination
had precipitated the use of race in its redistricting plan."
Upholding the district court, the Supreme Court noted that the
bulk of the state's evidence came from a report dated well after
enactment of the redistricting scheme at issue, and, indeed, after
the commencement of litigation.' 6' The evidence contained in the
report could not have driven the legislature to remedy a history of
electoral racism because it was not available until years after enactment, and thus provided no basis for determining the legislature's intent. Because the report was irrelevant to the constitutionally-necessary inquiry into legislative intent, it could not be
admitted at trial.'
Consider now the Shaw requirement that a state have a
strong basis in evidence before it enacts a racial classification. " '
The Federal Circuit in Rothe thought it instructive both that the
Shaw Court emphasized the word "before" in quoting this language from Wygant and that the Court used the phrase "strong
basis in evidence.'. The Federal Circuit noted that Shaw clarified the "strong basis in evidence" standard used by the Supreme
Court in Croson and Wygant"' This sends a clear signal that legislatures must have a "strong basis in evidence" prior to enacting
Shaw, 517 US at 908-10 n 4.

'"

6
167

'"
'"

Id at 908-09 n 4.
Id at 909-10.
Id at 910.
Shaw, 517 US at 910.

170Id.
171

Id.

Rothe, 262 F3d at 1327, citing Wygant, 476 US at 277.
173 Rothe, 262 F3d at 1326, citing Wygant, 476 US at 277-78; Croson, 488 US at 500.
17'
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a racial classification.17 ' What does this mean for post-enactment
evidence? Under Shaw, unless the legislature can prove a classification was constitutional based on evidence available to it on
the day of the statute's enactment, the law will be found unconstitutional."'
Even if the Supreme Court signaled that post-enactment evidence is inadmissible, one might argue that lower courts should
not apply that rule outside Shaw's racial gerrymandering context. The two contexts are different in that the injury in the racial
gerrymandering context implicates the fundamental right to
vote,'76 whereas the injury in the racial set-aside context implicates no such right. The Supreme Court has held, however, that
racial classifications in any context cause fundamental injury to
the individual rights of a person.' As such, the Court has applied
strict scrutiny in both contexts." To the extent that strict scrutiny requires the inadmissibility of post-enactment evidence,
Shaw requires its application in all strict scrutiny contexts.
Furthermore, the Rothe court noted that, though racial gerrymandering differs from public contracting, it is appropriate to
rely upon Supreme Court precedent from other factual situations
in determining whether a racial classification is constitutional. 9
The Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw, which draws extensively
upon precedent outside the gerrymandering context, bolsters this
conclusion." Shaw referenced extracontextual cases such as Croson, which dealt with racial set-asides in public contracting, and
Wygant, which considered racially discriminatory layoff policies
in public schools, in describing the evidentiary burden that North
Carolina failed to meet.'8' The Court's willingness in Shaw to rely
upon its reasoning in these contexts to determine the meaning
and requirements of strict scrutiny suggests that lower courts
should apply analogical reasoning in contexts other than that of
racial gerrymandering.
'..

See Rothe, 262 F3d at 1326-27 (discussing Croson and Wygant).

175 Id.

...See, for example, Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964) (noting that "the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society").
17 See Shaw, 527 US at 908, citing Goodman v Lukens Steel Co, 482 US 656, 661
(1987).
171 See Shaw, 527 US at 908 (applying strict scrutiny in racial gerrymandering context); see also Croson, 488 US at 498-500 (applying strict scrutiny to racial set-asides).
Rothe,
a
262 F3d at 1326-27 n 19.
"'
See Shaw 517 US at 931-935.
See id at 909 n 4, citing Croson, 488 US at 498-506, and at 908, 910, citing Wygant,
476 US at 274-75, 276, 288.
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The Unsound Reasoning of Appeals Courts That Admit PostEnactment Evidence
1. Analogy to interpretive limitations.

In Harrison & Burrows Bridge Constructors v Cuomo,"' the
Second Circuit considered post-enactment evidence in a racial
set-aside case."' The court considered the evidence because it was
used to draft regulations to implement the statutory scheme, and
the breadth of these regulations was at issue.'84 The Second Circuit noted that courts routinely consider this kind of evidence
when analyzing the constitutionality of speech-restrictive statutes."'
In Ward v Rock Against Racism," cited by the Second Circuit
in Harrison," the Supreme Court upheld a municipal sound ordinance against a First Amendment challenge."' In evaluating the
ordinance, the Court noted that it had to consider "any limiting
construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered."" If an ordinance as interpreted and applied following its
enactment was constitutional, then it would not be held unconstitutional even if it was facially invalid." In Village of Hoffman
Estates v Flipside,Hoffman Estates, Inc,"' also cited by the Harrison court," the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance regulating
the marketing and sale of drug paraphernalia against First
Amendment challenges."' Again, the Court refused to invalidate
the ordinance where post-enactment administrative regulations
limited its application to constitutionally proscribable speech."
The Second Circuit concluded that courts could similarly consider

981 F2d 50.
Id at 52-56.
"'
Id at 59-60.
Harrison, 981 F2d at 60, citing Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 795
(1989) (upholding a city sound ordinance because it did not violate the First Amendment
as applied); Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc, 455 US 489, 504
(1982) (upholding ordinance against a vagueness challenge because sufficiently clear as
applied, nor does it violate the First Amendment as applied).
.' 491 US 781 (1989).
Harrison,981 F2d at 60.
"
See Ward, 491 US at 790-803.
Id at 795.
"
See id.
455 US 489 (1982).
"2
Ward, 491 US at 60.
See Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 495-499.
"3
Id at 504.
"m

".
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post-enactment evidence of racial discrimination where such evidence was used to craft regulations to implement the statute.'"
The court's analogy to the First Amendment context is misplaced. The crucial inquiry in the First Amendment context is not
into legislative intent, but into the extent to which state action
proscribes constitutionally protected speech." Thus, the Supreme
Court noted in United States v O'Brien,197 a First Amendment
challenge to a statute making it a crime to burn one's draft card,
"[it] is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court
will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."' 98 If an administrative or judicial limitation keeps a statute from restricting protected speech, its constitutionality will be saved.'"
Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny, however, demands a
searching inquiry into legislative intent. "The purpose of strict
scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. "2' Indeed, a statute whose
real-world effects are wholly laudatory will still be struck down if
a court determines that the legislature acted with invidious intent. 21' The Harrisoncourt's analogy to the First Amendment con-

text is misplaced, because legislative intent is a non-issue in First
Amendment jurisprudence, but is utterly dispositive in Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny.
2. The Hobson's Choice.
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction allowed the consideration of post-enactment evidence so long as the
municipality had some concrete evidence of discrimination in a
particular industry prior to the enactment of a race-conscious re202
medial
program.
Thegovernmental
court believed that this was the only legal
rule that
would allow
entities to adopt racial classi-

" Harrison,981 F2d at 60.
1'9 See Ward, 491 US at 497 (noting that a complainant must show that a law is

impermissibly vague in its applicationsto fail under the due process clause).
'9' 391 US 367 (1968).
"' Id at 383.
19 Id.
"0
'9

See Croson, 488 US at 492.
See id.
See note 52 and accompanying text.
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fications to avoid liability stemming from their failure to act upon

available evidence of discrimination. ' 3
It is possible, however, to imagine an alternative regime
wherein post-enactment evidence would be inadmissible, but
which would avoid the Hobson's choice through the availability of
a corollary affirmative defense. Courts might apply a rule like the
following: in the absence of a remedial program, a governmental
agency has an affirmative defense in suits alleging discrimination
where the agency can establish that it is making reasonable, good
faith efforts to assess the scope of the problem and craft a constitutionally satisfactory solution. This would provide governmental
entities a period of time during which to perform the statistical
disparity studies required under Croson, to make the determination that only a racial set-aside can effectively remedy the discrimination (as opposed to a race-neutral policy), and to craft a
set-aside that is narrowly tailored to address the discrimination.2
The availability of such a defense would not preclude a city from
choosing a race-neutral remedial program if its study showed
that this was the best available option. This combination of inadmissibility and affirmative defense would allow governmental
entities to avoid liability to minorities while studying discrimination, but still exclude post-enactment evidence as required by
Shaw. 5
The Supreme Court has previously created affirmative defenses where public policy so demands.' In Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth2 11 the Court considered a case in which a female
employee claimed that the hostile work environment brought
about by supervisor's sexual harassment had forced her constructive discharge.2" The Court held that an employer is vicariously
liable where a supervisor creates a hostile work environment."
The Ellerth Court then crafted an affirmative defense allowing
the employer to show that it had exercised reasonable care to
prevent or promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and
that the employee had unreasonably failed to take advantage of

See notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
See note 18 (discussing Croson's evidentiary requirement).
See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Burlington Industries,Inc v Ellerth, 524 US 742, 765 (1998).
Id. See also Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775 (1998) (decided the same
day as Ellerth, and authorizing the same affirmative defense).
Ellerth, 524 US at 747-51 (describing facts and procedural history).
Id at 765.
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any corrective opportunities presented by the employer to avoid
the harm.10
Obviously, the sexual-harassment context in Ellerth differs
significantly from the racial set-aside context. Whereas sexual
harassment suits deal with the vicarious liability of employers for
the behavior of their employees,"' minority set-aside suits such as
Rothe, Coral Construction, and Harrison have to do with the direct liability of a governmental agency accused of unconstitutional racial discrimination in the awarding of contracts."' Ellerth
provides an affirmative defense against a suit brought under Title VII, whereas the racial set-aside context implicates concerns
of constitutional magnitude-a context in which a court might be
disinclined to create affirmative defenses.
If considering post-enactment evidence is unconstitutional,
however, courts face a Catch-22: they can either unconstitutionally admit such evidence, or can deny a remedy for unconstitutional behavior. The Coral Construction court's reasoning is
flawed because it fails to recognize that it could resolve this
Catch-22 in either direction: to justify admitting or excluding the
evidence at issue. Given that consideration of such evidence is
apparently unconstitutional, however, the dilemma should be
resolved against admissibility.
The Ellerth court held that where an employer makes a good
faith, reasonable effort to protect employees against sexual harassment, that employer will be granted limited immunity from
suit. 1" If Shaw does not allow the consideration of post-enactment
evidence, and if no effective race-neutral solution is available, a
governmental entity finds itself in a dilemma in the absence of
some similar kind of affirmative defense.214 It cannot institute an
affirmative action program without "convincing evidence, ' 2'° but it
might continue to cause actionable injury to minorities while it
gathers such evidence. 6 This could be avoided if courts allowed
an affirmative defense where a governmental entity can establish
210 Id.
211

See, generally, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Ques-

tionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U
Ark Little Rock L Rev 147, 149-52, 165-66 (2001) (describing sexual harassment law and
arguing that, unless more is known about sexual harassment training, programs should
not be relevant in litigation).
212 See notes 47-80 and 136-56 and accompanying text.
213 Id.
214 See notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
21 Wygant, 476 US at 277.
21 See id.
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that, at the time of the injury, it was engaged in good faith, reasonable efforts to craft a constitutionally satisfactory affirmative
action program."'
One might worry that this regime would provide a governmental entity a shield behind which to hide until the plaintiffs in
a case lose standing, lose interest, or just give up. In response to
Ellerth, a sizable industry has grown up around providing training and consulting services to employers to facilitate a "reasonable effort" affirmative defense. 18' The regime proposed in this
Comment might similarly create an incentive to slowly study discrimination in order to take advantage of the affirmative defense
while avoiding liability to injured minorities. To minimize this
potential, courts could limit the affirmative defense to allow only
a reasonable period of time to study the problem and craft a constitutionally satisfactory solution. A governmental entity's plea
that it is studying the problem would succeed only if it could
show a good faith effort that would likely bear fruit in the reasonably near future. Courts would be free to conclude that a city
whose investigation had dragged on for years is stalling to avoid
liability and the necessity of taking action. Further, given the
time-lag between injury, filing of suit, and the first court appearances, it might frequently be the case that such efforts would already have borne fruit by the time of trial.
In any event, the problems created by such a regime would
be no worse than those created by the alternative. Allowing postenactment evidence produces a system that encourages governmental entities to legislate with insufficient evidence, leading to
insufficiently narrow tailoring and consequent harms to individuals unconstitutionally denied government contracts because
of their race. If courts invite governmental entities to, as it were,
legislate first and ask questions later, it seems altogether likely
that they will accept the invitation. Given that racial classifications cause injury to fundamental individual rights 19 and actual
economic harm to people barred from competing for government
contracts on the basis of race, " ' governmental entities must be
given reasonable time to study the problems to avoid crafting
overly broad remedies.
See text accompanying notes 204-09.
See Bisom-Rapp, 24 U Ark L Rev at 148 (discussing sexual harassment training
programs) (cited in note 201).
219 Shaw, 517 US at 908.
217
218

m Croson, 488 US at 493-498.
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate
motives behind racial classification and to ensure that remedies
chosen are sufficiently narrow to avoid unnecessary harm.22' In
determining whether a legislature was motivated by racial hatred
or myths of racial inferiority, as opposed to the desire to remedy
racial discrimination, evidence gathered after enactment is simply irrelevant.222
The Supreme Court recognized in Shaw that a legislature
must have a strong basis in evidence before enacting a racial classification, and must narrowly tailor its remedy in order to fulfill
the requirements of strict scrutiny. 3 As the Federal Circuit held
in Rothe, this means courts cannot consider post-enactment evidence when determining the constitutionality of racial classifications.
This Comment has agreed with the Ninth Circuit's argument
in Coral Constructionthat requiring action on the part of cities to
avoid liability to minorities, while simultaneously barring postenactment evidence, creates a serious quandary for municipalities faced with evidence of their own culpability in fostering racial
discrimination. In light of its unconstitutionality under Shaw,
courts should resolve this dilemma by creating an affirmative
defense against suits by minorities where the city can establish
that, at the time of the litigated injury, it was engaged in good
faith and reasonable efforts to study the discrimination and craft
a constitutionally sound remedy. This would encourage cities to
address racial discrimination while leaving post-enactment evidence out of consideration as required under Shaw.
Courts must discourage legislatures from acting hastily when
drafting measures to remedy perceived racism. Legislative bodies
must carefully study the racial discrimination to determine its
scope and have sufficient evidence available to tailor the remedy
as narrowly as the problem will allow. Excluding post-enactment
evidence while giving a governmental entity a limited affirmative
defense is the best way to encourage limited use of racial classifications to combat racial discrimination, while providing govern-

2

Id at 493.

222

Id.
See Shaw, 517 US at 910.
Rothe, 262 F3d 1306, 1312.
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mental entities the 'safe harbor' from liability necessary to carefully craft constitutionally satisfactory programs.
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